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ESSAY





How should the legal system confront the advances in the brain
sciences that may possibly allow more accurate determinations of ve-
racity-lie detecting-than those that now pervade the litigation pro-
cess? In this Essay, I question the view, widespread among the
scientists most familiar with these advances, that the neuroscience of
lie detection is not, or at least not yet, nearly reliable enough to be
used in civil or criminal litigation or for related forensic purposes.
But in challenging the neuroscientists and their allies, I make no
claims about the science of lie detection that go beyond the current
state of scientific knowledge or, more importantly, my own ability to
speak about the relevant scientific developments. Rather, I argue that
because law's goals and norms differ from those of science, there is no
more reason to impose the standards of science on law than to impose
the standards of law on science. Law must use science, and should
always prefer good science to bad. In some contexts, however, good
science may still not be good enough for law, while in other con-
texts-hence the title of this Essay-bad science, as measured by the
standards of scientists, may still have valuable legal uses. To be clear,
my goal in this Essay is decidedly not to argue that neuroscience-based
lie detection should, now or even in the foreseeable future, necessarily
be admissible in court or used for other forensic purposes. Rather,
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my goal is to argue that the question of whether the law should use
neuroscience-based lie detection cannot be answered by scientific
standards of reliability and validity alone. Science can-and should-
inform the legal system about facts, including facts about degrees of
reliability and the extent of experimental validity, but the ultimate
normative and institutional question of whether and when, if at all, a
given degree of validity or reliability is sufficient for some legal or fo-
rensic purpose is a legal and not a scientific question.
In important respects, this analysis of the potential legal uses of
neuroscience-based lie detection is more a case study than a discrete
topic. Most of what I argue here applies to other forms of lie detec-
tion, to other forms of scientific evidence, and indeed to evidence
generally. Thus, as I elaborate in Part V of this Essay, my central
theme calls into doubt important dimensions of the modem revolu-
tion in the standards for the admission of scientific evidence. Com-
mencing with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' and
continuing through General Electric Co. v. Joinei2 and Kumho Tire Co.,
Ltd. v. Carmichael,3 the Supreme Court has for almost two decades at-
tempted to deal with the very real problem of 'junk science" by impos-
ing increasingly stringent scientific standards of reliability and
experimental validity on the admissibility of scientific evidence and
expert testimony in the federal courts. 4 By dealing with science and
experts but not with the myths and superstitions that pervade the fact-
finding process, however, the Court may have unintentionally lowered
the quality of evidence generally. By discouraging poor science while
leaving nonscience untouched, the Daubert revolution may have per-
versely fostered an increased reliance on the even worse nonscientific
evidence that dominates the litigation process by not masquerading as
science at all. This problem may not have an easy solution, but its
identification suggests that Daubert may have created as many
problems as it solved. The revolution in scientific and expert testi-
mony that started with Daubert is thus-or at least should be-far from
over.
1 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
3 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
4 See infta note 24 and accompanying text. Numerous state courts have also adopted
the Dauber approach. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 742 (Conn. 1997); Common-
wealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1348-49 (Mass. 1994); Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 687
N.E.2d 735, 740-41 (Ohio 1998); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 1993).
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I
LIE DETECTION, THEN AND Now: THE CLAIMS
I begin by describing the current controversy over the legal and
forensic5 uses of neuroscience-based lie detection. In some respects,
this controversy should come as no surprise. The common law litiga-
tion process places huge reliance on the sworn testimony of witnesses,
a phenomenon that is itself worthy of note.6 After all, many other
methods of factual investigation employ dramatically different ap-
proaches that rely far more heavily on primary, rather than secondary,
sources of knowledge. The scientist who seeks to determine whether
drinking red wine reduces the likelihood of heart disease does not, for
example, summon representatives of the wine industry and the Tem-
perance League to each make their cases and thereafter decide which
of the two advocates is more believable. Rather, she engages in the
kind of primary research that we call experimentation. Similarly, his-
torians who conduct archival research, psychologists who experiment
on subjects, empirical economists who perform multiple regressions
with large data sets, oceanographers who explore the sea with scien-
tific instruments or submersible watercraft, and researchers for policy-
makers who combine various techniques to determine the factual
terrain that a policy will affect all engage in one form or another of
primary research.
7
Once we grasp the diverse array of primary techniques for deter-
mining facts, we can understand how unusual the legal system is not
only in routinely using party-generated witnesses to provide informa-
tion as to which they, but not the trier of fact, have first-hand knowl-
edge,8 but also in precluding the trier of fact from obtaining the first-
5 In this Essay I use forensic, as distinguished from legal, to refer to those dimensions
of criminal investigation that either precede a trial or exist apart from it.
6 Although sworn witness testimony also plays a large role in the civil law, the qualifi-
cation to the common law in the accompanying text is a function of the somewhat larger
role that judges in many civil law countries play in managing the process of direct factual
investigation, especially in criminal cases. For good descriptions of the civil law approach,
see EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., 2002);
JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE INVESTI-
GATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN FRANCE (2005).
7 To be sure, law is not entirely alone in its reliance on testimonial evidence. Testi-
mony and other forms of indirect evidence do play a significant role in other investigative
and fact-finding enterprises. See, e.g., C.AJ. COADY, TESTIMONY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY
233-76 (1992) (surveying the use of testimony in history, mathematics, and psychology);
John Hardwig, The Role of Trust in Knowledge, 88 J. PHIL. 693 (1991) (discussing the role of
testimonial evidence in science and mathematics). Nevertheless, law is noteworthy in rely-
ing on testimony and authority more than most other disciplines, and conversely, relying
substantially less on direct investigation and experimentation, especially in courtroom set-
tings. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 62 (1990) ("[Aluthority
and hierarchy play a role in law that would be inimical to scientific inquiry.").
8 FED. R. EVID. 602.
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hand knowledge that in other domains remains the gold standard for
empirical reliability.9 Still, the legal system we have, idiosyncratic as it
is within the realm of empirical inquiry in relying so heavily on sec-
ond-hand knowledge, is one that often makes it important to deter-
mine which of two opposing witnesses is telling the truth.
Of course, not all trials involve a conflict between a truth teller
and a liar. Honest misperceptions and more or less honest omissions,
exaggerations, shadings, fudgings, slantings, bendings, and hedg-
ings I0 are an omnipresent feature of modern litigation. But so too is
flat-out lying. Because the legal system relies far more heavily on the
reports of witnesses than on primary investigation by the trier of fact,
it should come as no surprise that the law is preoccupied with trying
to assess whether the witnesses who testify in court (or otherwise pro-
vide information for legal or forensic decision making) are telling the
truth."'
Historically, the law relied on the oath to serve the truth-warrant-
ing function. 12 When people genuinely believed that lying under
oath would send them to hell, the law could comfortably rely on a
witness's fear of eternal damnation to provide confidence that wit-
nesses were likely to tell the truth.'
3
9 "'Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them
to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from
other fields of human inquiry."' Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593
(1993) (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Sub-
stance Litigation: The Legacy ofAgent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 643,
645 (1992). See also SHEILAJASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAw, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
IN AMERICA 7-11 (1995) (comparing the methods and goals of law and science); Susan
Haack, Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 2, 7-15 (2009) (distinguishing "the investigative character of science" from the
"adversarial culture of our legal system"); Harry W. Jones, Legal Inquiry and the Methods of
Science, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ROLE OF SCIENCE 122, 124 (Harry W.Jones ed., 1967) ("Le-
gal propositions have their origin not in empirical observation but in authoritative pro-
nouncement by a court or legislature."); James A. Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75
MICH. L. REv. 1058, 1062-64 (1977) (comparing the scientific and legal methods of deter-
mining truth).
10 See Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, Paltering, in DECEPTION: FROM AN-
CIENT EMPIRES TO INTERNET DATING 38, 38-41 (Brooke Harrington ed., 2009) (analyzing
various forms of deception not involving explicit falsity).
11 See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Ford, Lie Detection: Historical, Neuropsychiatric and Legal Dimen-
sions, 29 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIATRY 159, 165 (2006) ("The detection of liars and lies has been
an element of many professions in the legal [and] criminal justice . . . fields.").
12 See, e.g., Haack, supra note 9, at 3 (describing law's early reliance on the oath and
related religious tests).
13 See George Fisher, TheJuy's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 580, 583 (1997)
(noting that the legal system's reliance on the oath was based on "the perceived divine
power of the oath to compel truthful testimony" through "the threat of divine vengeance"
for perjured testimony). Thomas Raeburn White and Daniel Blau describe the history of
the oath and its religious aspects. See generally Thomas Raeburn White, Oaths in Judicial
Proceedings and Their Effect upon the Competency of Witnesses, 51 AM. L. REG. 373 (1903); Daniel
Blau, Note, Holy Scriptures and Unholy Strictures: Why the Enforcement of a Religious Orthodoxy in
[Vol. 95:11911194
2010] CAN BAD SCIENCE BE GOOD EVIDENCE? 1195
As religious belief diminished, or at least as law's confidence in it
as a guarantor of truth waned, the legal system increasingly relied on
faith in the lie-exposing powers of vigorous cross-examination. As cel-
ebrated in the Perry Mason television series of the 1950s and 1960s and
since reinforced by numerous items of popular culture,1 4 the legal
system has long believed that cross-examination so reduces the effec-
tiveness of lying so much that a truth-determining system that relies
on witness testimony and cross-examination will not be unacceptably
vulnerable to intentional deception.
15
More importantly, and because cross-examination is far less effec-
tive in exposing lies and liars than television writers and viewers be-
lieve,1 6 the legal system has placed its faith in judges andjuries. Now,
the legal system assigns the task of determining veracity, and credibil-
ity in general, to the trier of fact: most visibly, even if not the most
frequently, the jury.1 7 Among other things, the jury must assess the
demeanor of witnesses, their past record of truth telling, the internal
coherence of their stories, and the external coherence of their stories
with the stories of others, all in order to determine who is telling the
truth and who is not.'8
North Carolina Demands a More Refined Establishment Clause Analysis of Courtroom Oaths, 4 FIRST
AMENDMENT L. REV. 223, 227-29 (2006).
14 See Naomi Mezey & Mark C. Niles, Screening the Law: Ideology and Law in American
Popular Culture, 28 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 91, 116-17 (2005) ("[Perry Mason] had such a strong
popular cultural influence that millions of people born after its last episode aired are still
familiar both with the character and with his signature talent for dramatic and successful
cross-examination.").
15 See 5 WicoRE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (asserting that cross-exami-
nation is the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth").
16 SeeJules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn't: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and
the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REv. 727, 774-82 (2007) (noting the inability
of cross-examination to "undercut eyewitness reliability" in some respects, which may in
turn lead to erroneous identifications); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (1975) (characterizing the truth-determining ability of
the adversarial process as "untested" and lawyers' belief in it as "self-congratulat[ory]").
17 See, e.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) ("'[T]he jury is the lie-
detector.'") (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973)); United
States v. Thompson, 615 F.2d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1980) (describing the jury's function as
"credibility determination"); Bloom v. People, 185 P.3d 797, 807 (Colo. 2008)
("[P]olygraph evidence [is inadmissible because it] will prejudice the jury's evaluation of a
witness's credibility."); State v. Christiansen, 163 P.3d 1175, 1180 (Idaho 2007) ("' [Jurors]
are the judges of the credibility of witnesses."' (quoting People v. Barnes, 9 P. 532, 533
(Idaho 1886)); State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Iowa 1986) ("[W]eighing the truthful-
ness of a witness is a matter reserved exclusively to the fact finder."); State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d
231, 240 (Or. 1987) (Linde,J., concurring) ("The cherished courtroom drama of confron-
tation, oral testimony and cross-examination is designed to let a jury pass judgment on
[parties' and witnesses'] truthfulness and on the accuracy of their testimony."). See gener-
ally Fisher, supra note 13 (offering a comprehensive historical account of the rise of the
jury as lie detector in the American legal system).
18 See, e.g., James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903, 907-13
(2000) (discussing the various criteria that constitute credibility evidence, including de-
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Enter science. Because the criteria that judges and juries tradi-
tionally employ to evaluate the veracity of witnesses have been notori-
ously unreliable, 19 the quest for a scientific way of distinguishing the
truth teller from the liar has been with us for generations. Indeed,
the Frye test,20 which for many years was the prevailing legal standard
for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, arose in 1923
in the context of an unsuccessful attempt to admit into evidence a
rudimentary lie-detection machine invented by William Moulton Mar-
ston 2 1-perhaps better known as the creator of the comic book char-
acter Wonder Woman, whose attributes included possession of a
magic lasso, forged from the Magic Girdle of Aphrodite, which would
make anyone it encircled tell the truth without fail. 22 The device at
issue in Frye was a simple polygraph and not a magic lasso, but Frye did
not just set the standard for the admission of scientific evidence for
more than a half-century; its exclusion of lie-detection technology also
paved the way for the continuing exclusion, with few exceptions, of
lie-detection evidence in American courts.
23
The science of lie detection has improved considerably since
1923, but not by so much as to have led to large-scale changes in judi-
cial attitudes. Indeed, even after Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
meanor, reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statement, contradiction, and
corroboration).
19 See generally ALDERT VRij, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LYING
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (2000);Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of
the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72
NEBR. L. REV. 1157, 1190-97 (1993); Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv.
1075, 1082-88 (1991).
20 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that scientific
evidence must use methods generally accepted in the relevant scientific community in or-
der to be admissible).
21 Don Grubin & Lars Mardin, Lie Detection and the Polygraph: A Historical Review, 16J.
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 357, 359-60 (2005).
22 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 295 (2003).
23 Polygraph evidence is per se inadmissible in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., United
States v. Gilliard, 133 F.3d 809, 815 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d
192, 197 (4th Cir. 1997); State v.Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 690 (Minn. 2008). Otherjurisdic-
tions condition the admission of polygraph evidence on the stipulation of the parties. See,
e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 351.1 (1995); Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1986);
Wilkins v. State, 190 P.3d 957, 970 (Kan. 2008). New Mexico is the most prominent excep-
tion. See N.M. R. EVID. 11-707 (permitting the admission of polygraph evidence to prove
the "the truthfulness of any person called as a witness"). But other jurisdictions also ex-
press some increased sympathy to polygraph use. See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 104
F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a per se exclusion of polygraph evidence does
not survive Daubert); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing defen-
dant to use polygraph evidence at sentencing hearing); United States v. Galbreth, 908 F.
Supp. 877, 896 (D.N.M. 1995) (allowing polygraph evidence if examiner is properly quali-
fied); Commonwealth v. Duguay, 720 N.E.2d 458, 463 (Mass. 1999) ( requiring the reliabil-
ity of polygraphic evidence to "'be established by proof in a given case that a qualified
tester who conducted the test had in similar circumstances demonstrated ... the high level
of accuracy of the conclusions that the tester reached in those tests'").
[Vol. 95:11911196
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Inc.24 replaced Frye's "general acceptance" test in federal courts by in-
sisting on various indicia of scientific validity as a precondition to the
admissibility of evidence purporting to be scientific, 25 the situation
with respect to lie detection has remained much the same.
26
What makes the foregoing important is the rapidly changing state
of cognitive neuroscience-the study of human thinking using various
methods of (indirectly) measuring brain activity.2 7 The tools of mod-
ern neuroscience are numerous, but the most prominent of them is
fMRI-functional magnetic resonance imaging. 28 Commonly called
brain scanning, fMRI examination holds out the possibility of being
able to determine which parts of the brain perform which cognitive
tasks. Although novices seeing images of an fMRI scan sometimes be-
lieve that certain parts of the brain are "lighting up" with electrical
activity when engaged in certain tasks,29 what actually occurs is that
the activated portion of the brain recruits more oxygenated blood
cells to help it in its task. What appears to be a lit up part of the brain
is actually a part that has more oxygenated hemoglobin in it than it
had when it was less, or differently, cognitively engaged.
30
Hardly surprisingly, the development of fMRI technology has led
some researchers to conclude that this technology can be effective in
distinguishing liars from truth tellers. 31 If-and it is a huge if-differ-
24 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993) (holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 displaced
the Frye standard and instructing trial judges to "screen[ ] . . . scientific testimony or evi-
dence" for both legal relevance and scientific validity). The Supreme Court added further
refinements in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (holding that
trial courts' gatekeeping obligations under Daubert extend to nonscientific expert testi-
mony), and General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997) (declaring "abuse of
discretion" the appropriate standard in "reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or ex-
clude expert testimony under [Daubert]" (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 663 N.E.2d
255 (Mass. 1996))).
25 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
26 See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 701-02 (4th ed.
2009) (describing continuing exclusion of most polygraph evidence). See also supra note
23.
27 Marcus E. Raichle, A Brief History of Human Brain Mapping, 32 TRENDS IN NEUROS-
CIENCE 118, 118 (2008) ("Cognitive neuroscience combines the experimental strategies of
cognitive psychology with various techniques to actually examine how brain function sup-
ports mental activities.").
28 For accessible explanations of fMRI, see SCOrr A. HUETrEL, ALLEN W. SONG, &
GREGORY McCARTHY, FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (2004); Raichle, supra
note 27, at 118-25.
29 See Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimag-
ing as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1190
(2010); Matthew Baptiste Holloway, One Image, One Thousand Incriminating Words: Images of
Brain Activity and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 27 TEMP. J. Sci. TECH. & ENVTL. L.
141, 146 (2008).
30 Holloway, supra note 29, at 145-46.
31 The literature is large and growing. Some studies claim to have produced positive
conclusions regarding the capabilities of neuroscience-based lie detection. See, e.g., Chris-
tos Davatzikos et al., Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with Machine Learning Meth-
2010] 1197
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ent parts of the brain are active when a person is lying than when
telling the truth, or when acting deceptively rather than honestly,
then brain scans might be able to determine whether a person is lying
or telling the truth. Or so it is claimed. And especially by those who
see the commercial potential for just this technology. For-profit com-
ods: Application to Lie Detection, 28 NEURO1MAGE 663, 667-68 (2005) (concluding that a
nonlinear pattern classification method can detect patterns of brain activity associated with
lying); G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: AnfMJRI Investigation, 13
CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 832-38 (2003) (yielding results that "show that different patterns of
brain activation arise when people tell lies than when they tell the truth"); Joshua D.
Greene & Joseph M. Paxton, Patterns of Neural Activity Associated with Honest and Dishonest
Moral Decisions, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. 12506, 12509-10 (2009) (suggesting that
individual differences in brain "control network activity" are associated with differences in
presence of dishonest behavior); F. Andrew Kozel, Tamara M. Padgett & Mark George,
Brief Communication, A Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAV.
NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855 (2004) (finding that "[f]or lying, compared with telling the truth,
there is more activation in the right anterior cingulate, right inferior frontal, right
orbitofrontal, right middle frontal, and left middle temporal areas"); F. Andrew Kozel et
al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIA-
TRY 605, 611 (2005) [hereinafter Detecting Deception] (concluding that "fMRI can be used to
detect deception within a cooperative individual"); Andrew Kozel et al., A Pilot Study of
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in Healthy Young Men, 16 J.
NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 295, 304 (2004) (concluding that using blood
oxygen level dependent fMRI "to investigate brain changes associated with deception is...
possible"); Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast
Event-Related fMR, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262, 271 (2005) [hereinafter Telling Truth]
(concluding that fMRI images may be able to distinguish a truth from a lie on the basis
that a lie "appears to be a more working memory-intensive activity, characterized by in-
creased activation of the inferolateral cortex implicated in response selection, inhibition,
and generation"); D. D. Langleben et al., Rapid Communication, Brain Activity During Sim-
ulated Deception: An Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727,
730-31 (2002) (finding a "neurophysiological difference between deception and truth");
Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Neural Correlates of Feigned Memory Impairment, 28 NEUROIMAGE 305,
310-12 (2005); Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging,
15 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 157, 161-63 (2002) (concluding that it is "unfeasible" to control
one's cerebral activity to avoid lie detection); Donald H. Marks, Mehdi Adineh & Sudeepa
Gupta, Determination of Truth From Deception Using Functional MR[ and Cognitive Engrams, 5
INTERNET J. RADIOLOGY 1 (2006), http://www.ispub.com/journal/the-internet journal_
of-radiology/volume_5_numberl_35/article/determination of truthfrom_deception_
usingfunctional mri andcognitive-engrams.html (showing that "specific activation pat-
terns occur in the brain of individuals looking at specific pictures, and also whether they
are contemplating giving a truthful or a deceptive response"); Feroze B. Mohamed et al.,
Brain Mapping of Deception and Truth Telling about an Ecologically Valid Situation: Functional
MR Imaging and Polygraph Investigation-Initial Experience, 238 RADIOLOGY 679, 679 (2006)
(concluding that "[s] pecific areas of the brain involved in deception or truth telling can be
depicted with functional MR imaging"); Jennifer Maria Nufiez et al., Intentional False Re-
sponding Shares Neural Substrates with Response Conflict and Cognitive Control, 25 NEUROIMAGE
267, 273-76 (2005) (finding certain brain regions to be "significantly more active when
falsifying information as compared to when answering truthfully"); Sean A. Spence et al.,
Speaking of Secrets and Lies: The Contribution of Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex to Vocal Deception,
40 NEUROIMAGE 1411, 1415-18 (2008); Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioural and Functional
Anatomical Correlates of Deception in Humans, 12 NEURoREPORT 2849, 2851-52 (2001) (find-
ing that individuals telling lies have increased response times and increased activation in
specific regions of the brain).
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panies, in particular No Lie MR132 and Cephos, 33 have already begun
marketing their lie-detection services, and these companies and their
principals have been at the forefront of those touting the courtroom
and forensic potential of the new technology.
Neuroscience-based lie detection follows a long history of lie-de-
tection technology. The earliest polygraphs analyzed blood pressure,
but modern techniques include electroencephalography, which mea-
sures brain-generated electrical current,34 facial microexpression anal-
ysis, developed by the psychologist Paul Ekman3 5 and featured in the
television series "Lie to Me,"36 periorbital thermography,3 7 which mea-
sures the temperature around the eyes; and near-infrared spectros-
copy,38 which uses infrared light to measure changes in blood flow
and is thus the precursor of fMRI technology. These technologies
and methods have their adherents, but I focus on fMRI because it is
potentially the most reliable of these techniques-although not relia-
ble enough, as we will see, to persuade those most familiar with the
technology to endorse it for courtroom or forensic use.
II
NEUROSCIENCE-BASED LIE DETECTION: THE COUNTERCLAIMS
In legal and policy debates, perhaps almost as much as in physics,
every action appears to produce an equal and opposite reaction. And
so it has been with the reaction of mainstream academic neuroscien-
tists to the claims about the lie-detection potential of fMRI scans. A
prominent article by Stanford law professor Henry Greely and neuros-
cientist Judy Illes surveyed all of the existing studies of neuroscience-
based lie detection through 2006 and concluded that the studies indi-
vidually fell far short of existing scientific standards of rigor and col-
lectively did not come close to establishing the reliability of fMRI-
based lie detection.3 9 Accordingly, Greely and Illes urged a legally
32 See No Lie MRI Homepage, http://www.noliemri.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
33 See Cephos Homepage, http://www.cephoscorp.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
34 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Farwell & Sharon S. Smith, Using Brain MERMER to Detect
Knowledge Despite Efforts to Conceal, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 135, 135-37, 142 (2001).
35 PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES: CLUES TO DECEIT IN THE MARKETPLACE, POLITICS, AND
MARRIAGE 123-61 (rev. ed. 2009).
36 See Lie to Me Homepage, http://www.fox.com/lietome/about (last visited Apr. 10,
2010).
37 See, e.g., I. Pavlidis & J. Levine, Monitoring of Periorbital Blood Flow Rate Through Ther-
mal Image Analysis and Its Application to Polygraph Testing, 3 PRoc. 23RD ANN. INT'L CONF.
IEEE ENGINEERING MED. & BIOLOGY SOC'Y 2826, 2829 (2001).
38 See, e.g., Britton Chance et al., A Novel Method for Fast Imaging of Brain Function, Non-
Invasively, with Light, 2 OPTICS EXPRESS 411, 413 (1998).
39 Henry T. Greely &Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regu-
lation, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 377, 395-404 (2007). See alsoJane Campbell Moriarty, Visions of
Deception: Neuroimages and the Search for Truth, 42 AKRON L. REV. 739, 758-61 (2009) (argu-
ing that fMRI-based lie detection satisfies neither Fye nor Daubert standards); Michael S.
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imposed moratorium on the use of the technology for courtroom or
forensic purposes until a federal regulatory agency could establish its
reliability according to scientific standards. 40  Similarly, one leading
neuroscientist has insisted that the "data offer no compelling evidence
that fMRI will work for lie detection in the real world."41 Another has
concluded that "[a]t present we have no good ways of detecting de-
ception despite our very great need for them. '42 And still another has
concluded that using laboratory findings on fMRI lie detection in set-
tings "that can potentially impact individuals' legal rights" should, on
the current state of knowledge, "remain a research topic, instead of a
legal tool. ' 43 An editorial in Nature Neuroscience joined the chorus of
skepticism, 44 as did a report from a National Research Council com-
mittee,45 and several published articles by researchers and practition-
ers from various disciplines insisted that fMRI lie detection was not
ready for the "real world.
'46
Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CriM. L. 301,
311-20 (2006) (detailing conceptual, empirical, and practical limitations of fMRI-based lie
detection for use in the courtroom).
40 Greely & Illes, supra note 39, at 413.
41 Nancy Kanwisher, The Use ofJMRI Lie Detection: What Has Been Shown and What Has
Not, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT: SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS 7,12 (2009).
Kanwisher's use of "compelling" to set her threshold for usability is noteworthy because
much of the question of fMRI's legal use depends precisely on how strong the case must be
for fMRI-based lie detection before its use is permissible. To assert that the case must be
compelling is thus to impose a very high burden, but why the burden should be as high as
requiring "compelling" evidence, as opposed to, say, "plausible" evidence, "some" evi-
dence, or "more persuasive than not" evidence, is unclear. Much that follows in this Essay
is exactly about this issue, but it is important to recognize that those who insist at the outset
that the evidence be compelling have stacked the deck by, in essence, assuming the
conclusion.
42 Marcus E. Raichle, An Introduction to Functional Brain Imaging in the Context of Lie
Detection, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT, supra note 41, at 3, 6.
43 Elizabeth A. Phelps, Lying Outside the Laboratory: The Impact of Imagery and Emotion on
the Neural Circuitry of Lie Detection, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT, supra note 41, at
14, 20.
44 Editorial, Deceiving the Law, 11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1231, 1231 (2008) ("There is
little evidence to indicate that the newer [fMRI-based] lie-detection technologies... work
well enough to detect deception accurately on an individual level with an error rate that is
low enough to be anywhere near acceptable in court.").
45 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EMERGING COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND RELATED
TECHNOLOGIES 37 (2008) (concluding that "there has not yet been sufficient systematic
research to determine if functional neuroimaging can meet the challenges to the
neurophysiological detection of psychological states relevant to deception").
46 See, e.g., James R. Merikangas, Commentary: Functional MR[ Lie Detection, 36 J. AM.
AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 499, 499-501 (2008) (concluding that fMRI lie detection technol-
ogy does not meet the Daubert criteria for courtroom testimony); Michael S. Gazzaniga, The
Law and Neuroscience, 60 NEURON 412, 413, 415 (2008) (cautioning against the introduction
of neuroscience-based lie detection evidence because jurors and judges may erroneously
accept such evidence as legally dispositive);Jed S. Rakoff, Lie Detection in the Courts: The Vain
Search for the Magic Bullet, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT, supra note 41, at 40, 44
(arguing that neuroscience-based lie detection "suffers from several defects that would
render such evidence inadmissible under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 702"); Joseph R.
1200
CAN BAD SCIENCE BE GOOD EVIDENCE?
At the core of the campaign against the use of fMRI in real-world
legal settings is the conviction that the existing state of the research is
"poor science." And it is poor science, it is said, not only because of
doubts about the reliability rates of fMRI lie detection, but also, and
more fundamentally, because the research that allegedly supports the
proposed techniques and determines their reliability rates has serious
problems of experimental validity.4 7 The critics claim that the tests
that have been conducted are different in material ways from real-
world lying and truth telling, thus undermining the inference that
fMRI detection could accurately detect real-world liars just because it
accurately detects liars in experimental settings. 48 Part of the differ-
ence, indeed the major difference, is that in most instances the re-
searchers have instructed the experimental subjects to lie. But
whether an instructed lie is even a lie at all presents substantial ques-
tions of construct validity-whether the experiment measures what it
purports to measure-that cast significant doubt on the research con-
clusions.49 Additional doubts stem from the size and nature of the
samples, potential confounding variables (e.g., whether subjects are
left- or right-handed),50 and the significant possibility that subjects
could take countermeasures to render the test results unreliable.
51
Thus, the existing research stands accused of being flawed even as
pure laboratory research and of being far less applicable to
nonlaboratory settings than its proponents have typically claimed.
The charges against the existing research go even further. The
results have often been neither published in peer-reviewed journals
nor replicated, thus failing to satisfy the normal standards for assess-
Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to Be True?, 36J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
491, 493 (2008) (" [H]ow well fMRI lie detection would work in real-life situations remains
an open question."); Sean A. Spence, Playing Devil's Advocate: The Case Against fMRI Lie
Detection, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCH. 11, 11 (2008) (suggesting that fMRI-based lie
detection is inapplicable to the "real world" and lacks scientific reliability because no
fMRI-based lie detection study has been replicated).
47 For a discussion and definitions of scientific reliability and validity, albeit not iden-
tical to the usages here and in some of the relevant scientific literature, seeJOHN MONAHAN
& LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 57-67 (6th ed. 2006).
48 Greely & Illes, supra note 39, at 403-04 (noting the "artificiality of the deceptive
tasks" in fMRI studies and claiming that they bear no resemblance to lying in the real
world). A similar argument is that "[r]eports of finding brain patterns of activation corre-
sponding to 'deception' almost always use subjects (often university students) who are told
to lie about something (usually a relatively unimportant matter). Equating the lies told in
such an artificial setting to the kinds of lies people tell in reality is pure fantasy at this
point." Deceiving the Law, supra note 44, at 1231.
49 See, e.g., Kanwisher, supra note 41, at 12 (noting that a laboratory subject who lies
because he is "instructed to do so" is not lying); Greely & Illes, supra note 39, at 403-04.
50 Greely & Illes, supra note 39, at 402-04.
51 Critics claim that subjects can foil fMRI readings through detectable countermea-
sures, such as moving their tongues around, and undetectable countermeasures, such as
performing simple mental arithmetic. See Kanwisher, supra note 41, at 12. See also Greely &
Illes, supra note 39, at 404-05.
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ing scientific outcomes. 52 Moreover, quite a few of the experiments-
indeed, most of them-have been conducted by researchers whose
connection with No Lie MRI or Cephos gives them a commercial in-
terest in the outcome. 53 Finally, the alleged degree of accuracy-as
high as 90%, according to some claims54-of neural lie detection is
considerably higher than what could likely be expected in
nonlaboratory settings.
55
Insofar as the proponents of neural lie detection have maintained
their claims about the accuracy of their methods are scientifically
sound and the product of scientifically valid experimentation, they ap-
pear to have been exposed as relying on flawed science. Without bet-
ter evidence of external validity, without dealing with the construct
validity problem of distinguishing the genuine lie from following an
instruction to utter words that are not literally true, without more rig-
orous scrutiny of claims of reliability, without higher verified rates of
accuracy, without replication, and without subjecting the research to
peer review by financially disinterested scientists, the claimed ability of
fMRI to identify liars appears to be just that-a claim-and far from
what good scientists take to be a sound scientific conclusion.
III
ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC AND
LEGAL STANDARDS
That the science to date appears both methodologically flawed
and uncompelling in its conclusions is far from the end of the story,
the arguments of the skeptics notwithstanding. But the rest of the
story is not a story about science. Instead, it is a story about law56 and
about the reasons for doubting that the scientific failings of fMRI-
based lie detection are, or should be, dispositive for the legal system.
52 Kanwisher, supra note 41, at 13.
53 For example, Christos Davatzikos, the lead researcher of the Davatzikos study, supra
note 31, serves on the Science Board of No Lie MRI. See No Lie MRI Scientific Board,
http://noliemri.com/aboutUs/ScienceBoard.htm (last visited Apr. 10 2010). Similarly,
Frank Kozel, the lead researcher of the three Kozel studies, supra note 31, serves as a scien-
tific advisor for Cephos. See Cephos Scientific Advisors, http://cephoscorp.com/about-us/
index.php#scientific (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). Finally, No Lie MRI uses technology and
methods under a license from Daniel Langleben, lead researcher on many other studies,
supra note 31. See No Lie MRI Patents, http://www.noliemri.com/investors/Patents.htm
(last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
54 Detecting Deception, supra note 31, at 610. See also Davatzikos, supra note 31, at 663
(88%); Telling Truth, supra note 31, at 262 (78%).
55 Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Need for Regulation, in USING
IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT, supra note 41, at 46, 51 (arguing that reported accuracy rates
should be "taken with a grain of salt" because the actual accuracy of fMRI lie detection on
"diverse subjects in realistic settings, with or without countermeasures" is unknown).
56 See Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REv.
191, 203 (2003) (urging the use of legal standards in evaluating scientific expertise).
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Initially, we need to remind ourselves that law is about far more
than putting criminals in jail, although that is the particular type of
legal decision that motivates so much of the existing scientific criti-
cism. 5 7 One of the scientists quoted above said that tMRI results
would be especially unreliable if the subject believed that the results
could "'send him to prison." 58 And another participant at the same
symposium worried about a future in which the "'police may request a
warrant to search your brain.' 59 These may be legitimate worries, but
their seriousness depends largely on a view of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination that would characterize an invol-
untary lie-detection test of whatever kind as physical and nontestimo-
nial, 60 an outcome that seems unlikely, albeit not impossible. Given
that law enforcement authorities may not require a suspect to talk at
all, it is difficult to imagine that a defendant's statement could be sub-
ject to an involuntary neural evaluation of its accuracy. The circum-
stances in which an involuntary fMRI would be usable against a
defendant would thus not only require a court to reject an explicit
Supreme Court statement that the results of lie-detector tests are testi-
monial and hence encompassed by the Fifth Amendment 6' but would
also require the fMRI not to be used in conjunction with, or to test the
validity of, any statement made by the defendant.
62
Yet even if a future that includes brain-scan warrants is a legiti-
mate worry63 that requires us to guard against police or prosecution
use of fMRI lie detection, it does not follow that other potential court-
room and forensic uses of lie-detection technology are equally worri-
some. Whereas a defendant's negative results on an IMRI-based lie-
detection exam can hardly suffice to prove guilt "beyond a reasonable
doubt," for example, it is a different issue when the question is
whether a defendant could use an fMRI result to establish his inno-
cence under that same and highly defendant-protective burden of
57 See, e.g., Kanwisher, supra note 41, at 12 (noting that the stakes of lie detection in
the real world are "prison, or life, or life in prison").
58 Deborah Halber, Scientists: A Good Lie Detector Is Hard to Find, MIT NEws, Feb. 12,
2007, http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2007/lying.html (quoting Nancy Kanishwer, Profes-
sor of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT).
59 Id.
60 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment does not apply to physical, nontestimonial evidence taken from a suspect).
61 Id. at 763-64.
62 The Fifth Amendment issues are discussed in Benjamin Holley, It's All in Your Head:
Neurotechnological Lie Detection and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 28 DEv. MENTAL HEALTH
L. 1, 14-22 (2009), and Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for
Lie Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 359, 365-74 (2007).
63 A case in Mumbai, India has fueled this worry because the prosecution successfully
used an involuntary fMRI scan to challenge the veracity of a criminal defendant. SeeDeceiv-
ing the Law, supra note 44, at 1231.
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proof.6 4 Suppose, attaching some arbitrary but conservative numbers
to the existing research, that an fMRI evaluation of a defendant's
claim of innocence-"I was somewhere else" or "He started the
fight"-has an accuracy rate of 60 percent.65 It is of course clear that
we should not imprison people on a 60 percent probability of their
guilt, and we do not do so. But the question is not whether to im-
prison people who are 60 percent likely to be guilty. At least that is
not the only question. Equally important is whether, if there is a 60
percent chance that a defendant's claim of innocence is accurate, we
would want to conclude that his guilt has been proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt? Indeed, this was precisely the issue in the 1998 Su-
preme Court case of United States v. Scheffer.66 The defendant in
Scheffer sought to introduce a polygraph test supporting the accuracy
of his assertion of innocence. 67 The test results had been excluded
under Rule 707 of the Military Rules of Evidence, 68 and the defendant
challenged the constitutionality of Rule 707's absolute exclusion of
polygraphic evidence under the Due Process 69 and Compulsory Pro-
cess7 0 Clauses of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, respectively. The
Supreme Court, over Justice Stevens's dissent 7' and in the face of a
concern about a blanket rule of exclusion on the part of four other
Justices who concurred in part with Justice Thomas's opinion, 72 held
that a defendant had no constitutional right to offer polygraphic ex-
culpatory evidence. 73 That the defendant may not have a constitu-
tional right to admit a polygraph in his defense, however, does not
address the nonconstitutional question of whether such evidence
ought to be admissible under these or similar circumstances as a mat-
ter of policy. Moreover, the Scheffer majority's stark distinction be-
64 Commentators have described the evidence that a criminal defendant needs to
raise a reasonable doubt as "slight." Michael H. Graham, Burdens of Proof and Presumptions
in Criminal Cases, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 192 (2009).
65 Note that the accuracy rate for identifying truth may differ from the accuracy rate
for identifying a lie. Suppose a defendant claims that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed and that an fMRI indicates he is telling the truth. On the existing
state of the research, this fMRI result is more reliable-has a smaller likelihood of error-
than an fMRI result that indicates that the defendant's statement was false. See Kanwisher,
supra note 41, at 11. In other words, FMRI identifies truths as lies less often than it identi-
fies lies as truths.
66 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
67 Id. at 306.
68 Military Rule of Evidence 707 prohibits the admission of any lie-detection technol-
ogy in military trials. See MIL. R. EviD. 707; see also Scheffer 523 U.S. at 306-07.
69 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
70 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
71 See 523 U.S. at 320 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 318-20 (Kennedy, J. (joined by justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer),
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
73 Id. at 317.
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tween "reliable" and "unreliable '74 masks the important difference
between how reliable evidence must be in order for the prosecution
to use it and how reliable evidence must be in order for the defendant
to use it to raise the possibility of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt,
whether by buttressing his claim of innocence or, perhaps more likely,
by attacking the credibility of a police officer or other prosecution
witness.
Any scientific test will of course have some level of reliability.
Whether that level of reliability is high enough for admissibility, how-
ever, depends on the purposes for which the evidence is being em-
ployed. 75 If the outcome of a test is used as the principal evidence of
whether a defendant should go to prison, as it often is with DNA iden-
tification,7 6 we should demand extremely high levels of reliability. But
if the evidence is to be used merely as one component of a larger story
about whether a defendant should go to prison, then perhaps the
level of reliability can be lower-" [a] brick is not a wall," as the fa-
mous adage in the law of evidence goes.77 Although the standard of
proof for-conviction of a crime is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it
does not follow that every piece of evidence admissible to (cumula-
tively) establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt must be individually
capable of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty. 78 To require that each piece of evidence introduced by the
prosecution be reliable beyond a reasonable doubt would collapse the
standard for determining guilt into the standard for determining the
admissibility of an individual piece of evidence. 79 A fortiori, the level
of reliability for an individual item of evidence offered as part of a
larger array of evidence to show why a defendant should not go to
74 Id. at 309.
75 See Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science
and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L. REV. 1047, 1062 (1999) (arguing that reliability "is not
an all-or-nothing proposition, but rather depends on the application of the evidence and
the acceptable risk of error").
76 See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1444-48 (8th Cir. 1996) (ruling
that polymerase chain reaction DNA testing satisfied Daubert standards); United States v.
Cuff, 37 F. Supp. 2d 279, 280-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying motion in limine to exclude
DNA evidence); State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 12, 14-20 (Minn. 2008) (upholding convic-
tion where DNA "'cold hit' match" linked DNA profile of defendant with DNA of perpetra-
tor that police collected at crime scene).
77 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 729 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). See
also Judson F. Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 574, 576
(1956) ("[I]t is not to be supposed that every witness can make a home run.").
78 For more on the confusion of admissibility and sufficiency, see Dale A. Nance, Con-
ditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REV. 447, 449-59 (1990).
79 See United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding
that ballistics evidence is admissible in a criminal case even if it only makes a proposition
"'more likely than not"'); In re Ephedra Products Liability Litigation, 393 F. Supp. 2d 181,
187-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting the argument that scientific expert testimony must be
supported by "definitive scientific proof").
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prison can be lower still, arguably much lower.80 We do not, after all,
have a system in which a defendant goes to prison unless he can prove
by compelling evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt that he is not
guilty.
The same considerations apply to civil cases. The American legal
system employs the standard of proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence in almost all civil cases because the failure to award damages,
say, to an injured or otherwise wronged plaintiff is thought to be as
serious an error as wrongly requiring a nonculpable defendant to pay
damages. 8' Accordingly, it is hardly clear that a party in a civil lawsuit
80 For an extended argument in favor of asymmetry between prosecution and defense
in the standards for admission of scientific evidence, see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING
THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE, AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABIL-
ITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 131-44 (2007); compare Aaron Katz, A "Moving Bar" Approach to
Assessing the Admissibility of Expert Causation Testimony, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 579, 601 (2009)
(urging that the reliability requirement of Daubert and Joiner vary depending on the nature
of the case in which the issue arises). The strongest response to the argument for asymme-
try is that the presumption of innocence and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of
proof already incorporate the justifiable, defendant-skewed epistemic goals of the criminal
justice system and that overlaying special evidentiary burdens on the prosecution (or spe-
cial evidentiary benefits on the defense) would be a form of double counting. See LARRY
LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND THE CRIMINAL LAw: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 123-28,
144 (2006). But this argument rests on the assumption, perhaps justified but perhaps not,
that the existing standard of proof achieves the socially proper distribution of errors of
false acquittal and false conviction. If it does not, then, given the historical provenance of
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, adjusting the results of that standard through
other evidentiary, substantive, or procedural devices hardly seems inappropriate. Nor is
there reason to believe that the best way to achieve the optimal distribution of error is with
one burden of proof rule rather than a combination of multiple evidentiary and procedu-
ral rules. See Raphael M. Goldman & Alvin I. Goldman, Review of Truth, Error and the
Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology, by Larry Landau, 15 LEGAL THEORY 55,
59-60 (2009) (book review); Michael S. Pardo, On Misshapen Stones and Criminal Law's Epis-
temology, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 347, 371-74 (2007) (reviewing LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW, supra). Regardless of the outcome of the debate about asymmetry, how-
ever, the very existence of the debate and the terms on which it is conducted demonstrate
the folly of trying to determine questions of the legal usability of evidence without taking
legal goals and legal standards into account.
81 See In reWinship, 379 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan,J., concurring) ("In a civil suit
between two private parties for money damages, for example, we view it as no more serious
in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to
be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiffs favor."). On the decision-theoretic aspects of
burdens of proof in civil cases in general, see James Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponder-
ance of the Evidence Standard in Civil Litigation, 18 TULSA L.J. 79 (1982); Bruce L. Hay &
Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 413 (1997); John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factflnding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV.
1065 (1968); Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 647
(1994); Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse
Decisions, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (1996). Ronald Allen challenges the conventional view
about burdens in civil cases, arguing, correctly, that because the plaintiff must typically
prove each of the multiple elements of a cause of action by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the actual burden on the plaintiff is substantially higher than that on the defen-
dant. See Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof 13 CARDozo L. REV. 373 (1991);
Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401 (1986).
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should be precluded from using lie-detection technology that is insuf-
ficiently reliable to send someone to jail to bolster his assertions about
the facts of a civil case. Awarding damages is less serious than impris-
oning someone, or so our legal system believes, and it is consequently
a mistake to assume that a uniform standard of reliability should gov-
ern all legal uses of a particular type of evidence.
The foregoing discussion is about reliability, but the same analysis
applies to questions of validity as well. The experiments that allegedly
establish the reliability of fMRI lie detection have been attacked as
lacking external and construct validity, 82 but, like reliability, "scientific
validity... is a matter of degree.18 3 Accordingly, whether some de-
gree of experimental validity is good enough again depends on the
use to which the experiment is being put.84 Consider first the ques-
tion of external validity-whether laboratory results permit us to draw
inferences and make predictions about a different, nonlaboratory sub-
ject population. 5 This issue often arises with respect to psychological
experiments when and because conclusions drawn from experiments
using university undergraduates-a common pool of experimental
subjects-are used to predict the behavior of non-undergraduates in
nonlaboratory settings.8 6 Although the population about which the
predictions are made differs from the subject population, the experi-
mental research is useful when other research demonstrates a substan-
tial correlation between the results reached in the laboratory and
those observed in nonlaboratory settings.8 7 These correlations are not
perfect, of course, but they are positive to a substantial degree, and
whether that degree is substantial enough will depend on how the
research will be used. When laboratory research is claimed to justify a
policy with negative consequences for some segment of the public, for
example, a higher correlation between laboratory results and
nonlaboratory conclusions is necessary than when, say, the public is
merely being warned to be aware of a dangerous phenomenon that
thus far has been demonstrated only in the laboratory.
Although less obvious, the same considerations apply to construct
validity as well. Suppose we wish to examine the relationship between
eating a big breakfast and proficiency in performing mathematical
tasks. Suppose also that someone were then to conduct an experi-
82 See supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
83 Nance, supra note 56, at 200; See also Beecher-Monas, supra note 75, at 1062.
84 See, e.g., KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 17 (1997) ("[D]ecisions about validity depend on
the needs one has for the data.").
85 See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson, James J. Lindsay, & Brad J. Bushman, Research in the
Psychological Laboratory: Truth or Triviality, 8 CURRENT DIRECrIONS PSYCHOL. Sci. 3, 3 (1999).
86 Id. at 7.
87 Id. at 5.
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ment showing a relationship between eating a big breakfast and in-
creased ability to avoid misspellings for the rest of that day. If this
experiment were used to support a claim about breakfast and mathe-
matical proficiency, it would be open to the charge of construct valid-
ity, because what the experiment measured-spelling ability-was not
the same as what it was offered to show-mathematical proficiency.
But if the causes of spelling mistakes and the causes of mathematical
errors were shown to be positively correlated, then an experiment
showing an effect on the former would provide-in the absence of
evidence of relevant differences-some evidence of an effect on the
latter. The evidence would not be conclusive, but deficiencies in con-
struct validity would not render the experiment totally spurious in
terms of drawing conclusions about a different but correlated effect.
So too, perhaps, with the flaws in construct validity in many ex-
isting experiments on neural lie detection. With important excep-
tions 8 the experiments that purportedly establish the reliability of
fMRI lie detection are experiments in which the experimenters tell
subjects to lie or not lie.8 9 Critics argue that subjects are not actually
lying when they follow an instruction to lie and thus that an fMRI
result demonstrating a certain kind of brain activity for following an
instruction to lie tells us nothing about the kinds of brain activity in-
volved in actual lying.90 But even though this gap between the in-
structed lie and the real lie poses a significant construct validity
problem, it would render the experimental results valueless only if
there were no correlation at all between the causes of the brain activ-
ity involved in the real lie and those involved in the instructed lie. We
do not yet know whether such a correlation exists, 91 but if it does,
even slightly, it would again be incorrect to conclude that the existing
studies offer no-as opposed to slight-support for the use of fMRI-
based lie detection.
Slight support (or weak evidence) ought not to be good enough
for scientists,92 but it is often sufficient for the law. Not only do basic
88 See Greene & Paxton, supra note 31, at 12506-07 (describing an fMRI study that
provided an incentive to subjects to engage in dishonesty but instructed subjects to tell the
truth).
89 See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 46, at 494 ("All of the published literature involves
scenarios in which the volunteer subjects have been instructed to lie.").
90 See, e.g., Greely & Illes, supra note 39, at 403-04 (arguing that "[i]t is not clear how
this difference [i.e., the lie instruction] from the more usual lie detection settings would
affect the results" of the experiments); Kanwisher, supra note 41, at 12.
91 See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 46, at 494 ("No literature addresses the question of
how this basic fact [i.e., the command to lie] affects brain activation patterns, in compari-
son with the more realistic situation in which the person being tested makes a completely
free decision about whether to lie . . ").
92 See David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, 46 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 13, 20 (1983) ("'Typically, a scientist will not so certify evidence unless the
probability of error, by standard statistical measurement, is less than 5%.'" (quoting Ethyl
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principles of evidence law (as well as human thinking) routinely allow
the accumulation of weak (but not spurious) pieces of evidence-
whether in holistic story-creation form, 93 or for the related purpose of
prompting an inference to the best explanation, 94 or in more linear,
Bayesian fashion 95-and not only might weak evidence be sufficient to
allow a defendant to resist a prosecution's claim to have established
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but low standards of proof pervade
the legal system. In some states a plaintiff can resist a defendant's
motion for a directed verdict by offering only a "scintilla" of evi-
dence.9 6 In many contexts, evidence that is "substantial" but less than
a preponderance can generate legal results.9 7 And the police may
stop and frisk a person upon "reasonable suspicion"'9 and obtain a
search warrant by showing "probable cause" to believe that the search
will yield usable evidence. 99 For these and many other purposes, weak
(and thus potentially flawed) evidence serves important functions in
law. Requiring highly valid scientific processes to certify evidence as
''compelling," "conclusive," or even "highly reliable" in order for that
evidence to be usable would dramatically revamp the legal system as
we know it.
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). See also Raichle, supra note 42, at 5
(equating scientific "validity" with "high statistical quality").
93 For a description of and support for the "story model," see INSIDE THE JUROR: THE
PSYCIIOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAING (Reid Hastie ed., 1993); Reid Hastie, The Role of
"Stories" In Civil Jury Judgments, 32 UNIV. MICH. J.L. REFORM 227, 229-31 (1999); Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model 13
CARDozo L. REV. 519 (1991); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror
Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR 192-221 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
94 See Amalia Amaya, Inference to the Best Legal Explanation, in LEGAL EVIDENCE AND
PROOF: STATISTICS, STORIES, LOGIC 135, 138 (Hendrik Kaptein, Henry Prakken & Bart
Verhei eds., 2009) (describing inference to the best explanation in the law "as an 'infer-
ence to the most coherent theory of the case'"); Michael S. Pardo & RonaldJ. Allen, Juridi-
cal Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAw & PHIL. 223, 225 (2008) (arguing that "the process
of inference to the best explanation itself best explains both the macro-structure of proof
at trial and the micro-level issues regarding the relevance and value of particular items of
evidence").
95 Bayesian approaches, inherently more incremental and thus less holistic, provide
"a framework for quantifying uncertainty and methods for revising uncertainty measures in
the light of acquired evidence." Stephen E. Fienberg & MarkJ. Schervish, The Relevance of
Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U.
L. REV. 771, 773 (1986); Alvin I. Goldman, Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence, 42
JURIMETRICS 237 (2002).
96 See, e.g., Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (S.C. 2009) (" [n
cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the non-moving party
is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a motion for
summary judgment.")
97 See, e.g., De La Fuente 1I v. FDIC, 332 F.3d 1208, 1220 (9th Cir. 2003).
98 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
99 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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IV
JUDGES, JURIES, AND THE DANGERS OF MISUSE
Against much of the foregoing, it is often argued that juries are
easily influenced by misleading evidence and are inept at critically
evaluating technical evidence. 100 As a result, the critics argue that su-
perficially persuasive pseudoscientific evidence will have a greater ef-
fect on deliberations than it should. 10 1 Because jurors cannot
evaluate scientific evidence critically and cannot appropriately weigh
weak but nonspurious evidence, one weakly scientific brick will turn
out, it is said, to constitute the entire wall for most jurors.
This reliance on juror incompetence to justify excluding neuros-
cience evidence seems misplaced, however, or, at the very least, pre-
mature. As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that jury trials are
a small and diminishing proportion of all trials,10 2 and we might thus
want to be cautious about taking the jury as more central to legal deci-
sion making than it really is. More importantly, however, the empiri-
cal evidence on jury overvaluation is decidedly mixed.10 3 Indeed, if
we (and the neuroscientists) subjected the common claims of jury
overvaluation to the same scrutiny that we subject scientific evidence,
100 For an example of an argument that misleading evidence persuades juries, see Wal-
ter Sinnott-Armstrong et al., Brain Images as Legal Evidence, 5 EPISTEME 359, 367-70 (2008).
On juror incompetence more generally, see Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Un-
derlying the Debate About Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific
"Objectivity," 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1086-88 (1993).
101 See, e.g., Gazzaniga, supra note 46, at 413 (cautioning against the "undisciplined"
use of neuroscience evidence since jurors tend to "over-accept[ ]" such findings "and even
prematurely grant[ ] the status of sheer truth to some").
102 See Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Juy-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L.
REv. 165, 172-75 (2006).
103 See LAUDAN, supra note 80, at 214-15. For good summaries of the existing primary
research, much of which suggests thatjuries are not nearly as inept at evaluating scientific
or expert evidence as is often supposed, see NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN
JURIES: T14E VERDICT 177-80 (2007); Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valua-
tion Concern, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 967, 982-86 (2003);Jacobs, supra note 100, at 1086-93;
Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert Testimony on Juror
Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 267, 273-77 (2001); Rich-
ard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVILJURY SYSTEM 181, 230-35 (Robert E. Litan ed. 1993); Dale A. Nance &
Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Rela-
tively Large and Quantfiable Random Match Probability, 42 JURIMETRICS 403, 404 (2002); Neil
Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 1121,
1149-66 (2001). See also Cheryl Boudreau & Mathew D. McCubbins, Competition in the
Courtroom: When Does Expert Testimony Improve Jurors' Decisions ? 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
793, 814-15 (2009) (finding that juror comprehension of expert testimony can increase
when opposing experts exchange reasons with each other); Joseph Sanders, The Merits of
the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL
L. REv. 881, 908-10, 936-38 (2003) (endorsing the jury overvaluation worry but basing it
more on problems of complexity of evidence rather than on jury misunderstanding of
science or expertise and suggesting that even complexity may not present insurmountable
problems).
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we might find that the alleged basis for excluding bad scientific evi-
dence itself rests on less than ideal science. Consider the research
purportedly showing that people take brain scan images as having
more evidentiary value than such images actually have. 10 4  One
study105 compared the effect of textual "neurobabble" with the effect
of accurate explanations; another compared brain scans to plain text,
simple color bar graphs, and a topographical map;10 6 and a third com-
pared the effects of neuroimages with psychological testimony read
aloud in insanity defense cases. 10 7 But none compared the brain scan
or neural explanation to otherwise identical or even substantially simi-
lar non-brain evidence. By failing to exclude the potentially con-
founding variables of image type, especially photographic
representation, the researchers cannot properly conclude that the
distortion of evidentiary valuation was an effect of the brain scans
rather than the effect of a photographic image, 10 8 of a representa-
tional image (or even drawing) in complex color, or of complex infor-
mation presented without opposing explanations and opportunity for
cross-examination. Consequently, we lack evidence that judges and
juries overvalue brain-scan evidence compared to the kind of visual
evidence routinely used in trials, and we do have some evidence that
jurors may understand more than we think they do. 109 Moreover, in
practice if not in theory, the admissibility and use of some types of
evidence may vary with whether it is the judge or jury who is serving as
104 See David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing is Believing: The Effect of Brain Images on
Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343, 349-51 (2008) (concluding that "there
is, indeed, something special about the brain images with respect to influencing judgments
of scientific credibility"); Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience
Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470, 475-77 (2008) (finding that "logically
irrelevant neuroscience information can be seductive-it can have much more of an im-
pact on participants' judgments than it ought to").
105 See Weisberg et al., supra note 104, at 471-72, 475-77. The term "neurobabble"
comes from Sinnott-Armstrong et al., supra note 100, at 368.
106 McCabe & Castel, supra note 104, at 345-47, 349-51 ("The use of brain images to
represent the level of brain activity associated with cognitive processes influenced ratings of
the scientific merit of the reported research, compared to identical articles including no
image, a bar graph, or a topographical map.").
107 Jessica R. Gurley & David K Marcus, The Effects of Neuroimaging and Brain Injury on
Insanity Defenses, 26 BEnAv. Sci. & L. 85, 93-95 (2008) ("The addition of neuroimages
showing brain damage increased the likelihood of a [not guilty by reason of insanity]
verdict.").
108 See Adina L. Roskies, Are Neuroimages Like Photographs of the Brain?, 74 PHIL. Sci. 860,
868 (2007) (criticizing the conflation of photography and neuroimaging); Sinnott-Arm-
strong et al., supra note 100, at 367-68 (discussing the impact of photographic evidence).
On the distorting effect of photographs generally, see David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-
Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 183 (2006), and on the distorting effect of colored images, see Aura Hanna &
Roger Remington, The Representation of Color and Form in Long-Term Memory, 24 MEMORY &
COGNITION 322, 328-29 (1996).
109 See supra note 103.
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the trier of fact, just as it does in the case of hearsay110 Even to the
extent that juror misperception is a legitimate worry, extrapolating
this worry to the legal system generally would be mistaken, precisely
because juries make none of the decisions regarding reasonable suspi-
cion to stop, probable cause to search, and other decisions as to which
the credibility of a police officer is especially at issue and because ju-
ries make only a small percentage of trial decisions."1 Admittedly,
designing an evidentiary system in which admissibility varied depend-
ing on whether the trier of fact was judge or jury would encounter
difficulties, and formally, if not informally, the American legal system
has rejected such an approach. But whether skepticism about juror
comprehension, even if well-grounded, is the appropriate model for
all of law again cannot be determined without regard to the normative
goals of the legal system.
A related objection might be that allowing thresholds of reliabil-
ity to vary depending on their use would be undercut by cognitive
(and even precedential) contamination across those uses. Would al-
lowing defendants to use fMRI lie-detection evidence to support a
claim of innocence lead to allowing prosecutors or plaintiffs to do the
same in proceeding against a possibly nonculpable defendant?"
12
Would authorizing judges to hear fMRI lie-detection evidence in eval-
uating the credibility of a police officer at a suppression hearing lead
to permitting juries to hear such evidence in determining ultimate
guilt or innocence? We should not dismiss these potential worries as
completely fanciful, but again these are empirical and causal claims
about the effect of one action on another. It is more than a bit ironic,
that those most insistent about finding a sound scientific and empiri-
cal basis for the admission of various forms of evidence often seem
comfortable abandoning science in favor of their own hunches when
the question is about the potential downstream dangers of allowing
certain forms of evidence to be used for a particular purpose. Those
dangers may exist, but no scientific evidence exists to support such a
view. For now, the empirical support for the belief that allowing fMRI
lie detection by a defendant in a criminal case will lead to allowing
fMRI lie detection by the prosecution against an unwilling defendant
appears to be no stronger than the empirical support for the view that
fMRI lie detection can actually distinguish liars from truth tellers.
110 See Schauer, supra note 102, at 166 n.3.
111 See id. at 172 & n.31.
112 Justice Stevens notes and responds to this objection in United States v. Scheffer,
523 U.S. 303, 338 n.29 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing against the proposition
that allowing the defendant to admit exculpatory polygraph evidence would result in per-
mitting the prosecution "to introduce inculpatory test results").
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V
COMPARED TO WHAT?
In law, as in science, a crucial question is, "compared to what?"
And this question can usefully be applied to determining witness ve-
racity in courts of law. Traditionally, the legal system has left the as-
sessment of witness credibility and veracity to the scientifically-
unaided determination of the trier of fact, but just what mechanisms
do judges and juries use to make these determinations? We know that
jurors often use characteristics other than the content of what a wit-
ness says to evaluate the truth of a witness's claim, including factors
such as whether a witness looks up or down, fidgets, speaks slowly or
quickly, and speaks with apparent confidence; and we know that such
factors are at best highly unreliable and at worst random.1 13 Indeed,
numerous studies of the ability of untrained people to determine
truth telling in others rarely rises above 60 percent, where 50 percent
is the probability that a purely random guess is correct.114 Moreover,
the rules of evidence themselves exacerbate the problem of unreliable
determination of veracity by judges and juries by presuming on the
basis of scarcely more than venerable superstition that those who have
been convicted of serious crimes, even crimes not involving dishonest
statements, are more likely to lie than those who have not,115 by al-
lowing witnesses to offer testimony about whether other witnesses
have a reputation in the community for lying or truth telling, 116 and
by permitting witnesses to offer their personal opinions about the gen-
eral credibility of other witnesses.
117
We can now reframe our question. The question is not, or at least
not only, whether fMRI-based lie detection is reliable enough in the
abstract to be used in court. Rather, it is whether there are sound
reasons to prohibit the use of evidence of witness veracity that is likely
better, and is at least no worse, than the evidence of witness veracity
that now dominates the litigation process. The choice is not between
very good evidence of veracity and inferior fMRI evidence; it is be-
tween less good-bad, if you will-fMRI evidence and the even worse
evidence that is not only permitted, but also forms the core of the
common law trial process. And although it is sometimes a weak argu-
ment for a conclusion that something else is worse, if the something
113 See supra notes 18-19.
114 See Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 214, 214, 217 (2006); see also Maureen O'Sullivan, Why
Most People Parse Palters, Fibs, Lies, Whoppers, and Other Deceptions Poorly, in DECEPTION, supra
note 10, at 74; Aldert Vrij et al., Increasing Cognitive Load to Facilitate Lie Detection: The Benefit
of Recalling an Event in Reverse Order, 32 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 253 (2008).
115 FED. R. EviD. 609(a) (1).




else is unlikely to change and the improvement is plausible, then the
argument is not so weak after all.
VI
ON THE USES AND LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE:
DOUBTING DAUBERT
The tone of the foregoing notwithstanding, it is decidedly not my
goal here to argue for the admissibility of fMRI-based lie-detection evi-
dence in the courtroom or for related forensic purposes. Rather, it is
to suggest that the reliability and validity standards for scientific evi-
dence that courts use must be standards that come, ultimately, from
the legal goals of legal institutions and not from the scientific goals of
scientific institutions.' 18 Science can tell us that a certain scientific
process has, say, a 12 percent error rate (or specific rates of Type I and
Type II errors or false positives and false negatives). And scientists
must decide for their own scientific purposes whether such rates are
sufficient, for example, to assert that something is the case, conclude
that a finding is adequate for publication, or find a research program
promising enough to renew a research grant. But whether such an
error rate is sufficient for a trier of fact to hear it, put someone in jail,
keep someone out of jail, justify an injunction, or award damages is
not itself a scientific question.
The same applies to methods of inquiry. Science properly relies
on peer review, replication, and other indicia of sound methodology.
But whether these are the right indicia for purposes of nonscientific
action, including but not limited to courtroom verdicts, is not a scien-
tific determination,1 9 and to think otherwise is often to believe erro-
neously that one can derive a legal or policy ought from a scientific is.
Evidence cognoscenti will detect in this a challenge to Daubert it-
self, and that may be so. Daubert and its successors 120 were aimed pri-
marily at products liability and mass tort verdicts based on allegedly
persuasive but unreliable junk science. 121 Indeed, it is difficult to read
the description of the tire failure expert in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael'22 without recognizing that junk science really does ex-
118 See sources cited supra note 9. See also Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance
Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court's Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 300-02 (2001) (distinguishing legal and
scientific standards of causation).
119 See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN TIHE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND RE-
SEARCH ISSUES § 1-3.5.1 (2002) (determining value of scientific expert opinion "is a matter
of policy, not science").
120 See supra note 24.
121 See, e.g., United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
JOSEPH SANDERS, BENECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 210 (1998).
122 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
[Vol. 95:11911214
CAN BAD SCIENCE BE GOOD EVIDENCE?
ist.1 23 And the legal system no doubt must guard against a world in
which experts in astrology, phrenology, and countless other bogus-
ologies, some of which appear superficially more plausible than astrol-
ogy and phrenology but have little more grounding in fact, have a
place in the courtroom. Moreover, and as the recent National Acad-
emy of Sciences study documented in detail, 124 many traditionally
used methods of forensic identification-bite marks, shoe prints,
handwriting analysis, ballistics, tool marks, and even fingerprints'
25 -
have less scientific backing than their proponents have claimed and
less than the legal system has historically accepted.
1 26
Identifying the problem is thus straightforward: prior to the
Daubert revolution, American courts admitted into evidence experts
and tests purporting to demonstrate defective manufacture, causa-
tion, or identification, but which in reality were based on empirical
conclusions that had no sound scientific basis as measured by the stan-
dards of science. Without Daubert, so the argument goes,1 27 such
pseudoscientific or weak scientific evidence will continue to be admit-
ted into evidence and continue to persuade juries notwithstanding its
scientific weakness. As a consequence, innocent defendants will be
convicted and nonculpable tort defendants will be held liable to an
unacceptable degree.
The aforesaid steps to the Daubert conclusion are based on empir-
ical claims for which there is little empirical evidence. We do not
know with confidence, for example, how often the admission of scien-
tifically substandard evidence has produced erroneous verdicts. Sub-
standard evidence could produce erroneous verdicts in cases where
the following three conditions are true: where better evidence leading
to the same conclusion does not accompany the substandard evi-
123 On the junk science problem generally, see PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE:
JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
124 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 127-82 (2009).
125 See, e.g., United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 355 (D. Mass. 2006) (ex-
cluding ballistics testimony); United States v. Green, 405 F.2d 104, 120-22 (D. Mass. 2005)
(same); cf Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" is Re-
vealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 605 (2002) (questioning scientific basis for fingerprint matching).
126 See Michael J. Saks, Explaining the Tension Between the Supreme Court's Embrace of Valid-
ity as the Touchstone of Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Lower Courts' (Seeming) Rejection of
Same, 5 EPISTEME 329, 330-32 (2008) ("[F]orensic science evidence stands on a foundation
more of impressions and faith than of science."); Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Les-
sons from the Law's Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
1069, 1094-1127 (1998).
127 Indeed, Justice Stevens acknowledged the view that Daubert addressed the too easy
acceptance of 'junk science." See General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 n.6 (1997)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also, e.g., Maxine D. Goodman,
A Hedgehog on the Witness Stand-What's the Big Idea?: The Challenges of Using Daubert to Assess
Social Science and Nonscientific Testimony, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 635, 645 & n.43 (2010) (noting
that Daubert addressed the problem of junk science).
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dence, where the substandard evidence causes the trier of fact to find
for the prosecution or plaintiff where otherwise the verdict would
have been different, and where the defendant was not in fact guilty or
culpable. These three conditions may all be present in many cases,
but how many cases is uncertain. It is also uncertain what proportion
of all cases, verdicts, accidents, or crimes they constitute. It is thus far
from clear how much of a problem erroneous judgments are, and
how effective Daubert has been in solving it. Nor is it clear that the
best solution to the problem of junk science is one that is applied at
the point of admissibility, because solving or ameliorating the junk
science or erroneous verdict problem by vigorous use of summary
judgment, directed verdicts, and dismissal could likely achieve the
same result without mistakenly importing the all-things-considered re-
liability of a party's entire case into the determination of the admissi-
bility of particular pieces of evidence.
128
But even if Daubert has significantly reduced the number of erro-
neous verdicts that poor science actually causes, the "compared to
what" question still looms. Bad science is worse than good science,
but may not be worse than the nonscience that lurks in the heads of
judges and jurors. And flawed science is hardly worse than the super-
stitions and urban legends that influence so much of public poli-
cymaking and legal decision making.1 29 Daubert is based on the sound
premise that a manufacturer should not be liable for damages unless
there is a genuine basis for believing that some negligent act of the
manufacturer actually caused injury to the user of the product, but it
is important to contemplate what occurs when bad science, measured
by scientific standards, is excluded from litigation. The answer to this
question is unclear, but in the absence of weak but probative science,
litigants may offer, and courts may admit, even more nonexpert and
nonscientific evidence. After all, the American civil litigation system
does not prohibit automobile tort victims from recovering unless they
can show with scientific reliability that the defendant was driving neg-
ligently, nor does it prohibit defendants from offering a wide variety
of nonscientific evidence to keep themselves out of prison. Requiring
that science guide all legal determinations of guilt or innocence, lia-
bility or nonliability, is utopian in both the best and worst senses of
128 See Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L. REv.
1047, 1053-56 (2003); Nance, supra note 56, at 252; Michael S. Pardo, Evidence Theory and
the NAS Report on Forensic Science, 2010 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at
23-24), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511719. For the related argument that
standards for the authentication of documents are better understood and determined as
matters of evidentiary sufficiency, see Lawrence A. Alexander & Elaine A. Alexander, The
Authentication of Documents Requirement: Barrier to Falsehood or to Truth?, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
266, 278-79 (1973).
129 See supra notes 115-17.
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that word. 1 30 Best in the sense that such a system might achieve more
justice than the one we now have; but worst in the sense that eliminat-
ing bad or flawed science from the courtroom, the legal system, and
the rules of evidence would require a dismantling of the entire edifice
of common law adjudication so unlikely as to produce perverse re-
sults. Attempting to make litigation more scientific by keeping out
bad science while not doing anything about the ubiquitous non-
science that pervades the entire system might well result in a system
that is less scientific and less reliable because it keeps out somewhat
poor science and while letting the really poor science sneak in
through the backdoor by not calling itself science at all.
At the heart of the controversy over law's use of poor science is
the justified concern of scientists to keep their scientific enterprise free
from nonscientific taint. When science that is not ready for prime
scientific time is commandeered for commercial gain, science suffers,
as with the commercialization of fMRI-based lie detection. Encourag-
ing shoddy science for legal or policy use is bad for science, and in the
long run may-and this is an empirical question-hurt us all by pol-
luting science and devaluing its public and policy use. But the tension
between the worthy goals of long-term scientific integrity and the
short-term value of imperfect scientific output is hardly new and
hardly unique to lie detection or the law of evidence. When medical
researchers performing placebo-controlled experiments reach a point
at which they suspect but do not yet know with scientific confidence
that a new drug will cure a fatal disease, 13' they face the same moral
dilemma that Dr. Martin Arrowsmith faced in Sinclair Lewis's great
novel' 32 and countless real research physicians have faced before and
after: whether to sacrifice science to the alleviation of immediate suf-
fering or to sacrifice people and their health to long-term scientific
integrity. The stakes with respect to fMRI-based lie detection are typi-
cally lower, but the question is the same. If flawed or commercially
motivated science is usable in law, science will suffer. But if flawed or
commercially motivated science is barred from the law in the name of
science, law's own goals may suffer,1 3 3 and the tension and tradeoffs
130 This realization may be why Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael made clear that al-
though Daubert's broad concept of reliability is applicable to all expert testimony, using the
norms of science to evaluate reliability is only necessary when the proposed evidence or
testimony purports to be scientific. See 526 U.S. 137, 151-52 (1999); see also supra note 79
and accompanying text.
131 See ROBERTJ. LEviNE, THE i EHitw; AND RLGULA I ION 01 CLINICAL RESEARCII 185-213
(2d ed. 1986); Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible Research or
Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REv. 449, 451 (2001).
132 SINCLAIR LEWIS, ARROWSMITH (1925).
133 The obligation of law simply to reach a decision and the inability of law to post-
pone ajudgment until better evidence is available are especially important in this context.
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between the goals of law and of science can never be completely
eliminated.1
34
That the evaluation of science within the legal system must be
based on characteristically legal goals, standards, and norms is an-
other example of the partial distinctiveness of legal thinking, analysis,
and decision making.'3 5 Judges base their decisions on stare decisis,
but elementary textbooks on informal logic treat arguments from past
practice as a fallacy. Lawyers are expected to rely on authority, but
thoughtful scientists recognize that reliance on scientific authority is
often at odds with scientific method. When Blackstone observed that
"it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suf-
fer," 13 6 he not only drew on ideas now associated with Type I and Type
II errors but also made clear that law's own goals required subjugating
maximum accuracy to the greater value of personal liberty. 1 7 As
these examples show, it is a mistake to assume that the job of law is to
enforce or replicate the decision-making modes of other disciplines
and other domains. And so it is with the standards that law uses to
determine whether evidence, scientific and otherwise, is sufficiently
reliable to be usable for this or that legal purpose. Law must listen to
what neuroscientists say about neuroscience, but it must also be atten-
tive to the adjectives and adverbs. When neuroscientists say that there
is no "compelling" evidence of fMRI's lie-detecting reliability, that
See Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role in Civil Litigation and the Abdication of Legal Values in
Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 943, 947-48 (2003).
134 When I suggest that the decision about the use or nonuse of neuroscience-based lie
detection for trial or forensic purposes must be made according to legal standards, I do
not also mean to suggest that the decision should be made solely by lawyers and judges.
Committees or other decision-making processes which represent both legal and scientific
professionals would be preferable to leaving the decision solely to legal professionals or
solely to scientists. My principal concern in this paper is to argue against the view that only
scientists applying scientific criteria should decide on the appropriate uses for science or
its conclusions.
135 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 211-12 (2009).
136 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. See also Alexander Volokh, Aside, n
Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173 (1997). Modern analyses of the Blackstonian maxim
have understood, properly, that we should be interested in the consequences or utilities of
four and not just two different outcomes-true convictions, false convictions, true acquit-
tals, and false acquittals. See Alan Cullison, Probability Analysis ofJudicial Fact-Finding: A Pre-
liminary Outline of the Subjective Approach, I U. TOL. L. REv. 538, 564-68 (1969); Richard D.
Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact and Law, 86 Nw. U. L. Riv.
916, 938 (1992); Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of
Variability, 36 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 85, 93-96 (2002); Michael L. DeKay, The Difference Between
Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of Proof 21 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 95,
99-100 (1996); Lawrence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1375 (1971).
137 See David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence in Flatland: The Geometry of a World Without
Scientific Culture, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 255, 267 (2003) (achieving balance between false
positives and false negatives is a legal question).
1218 [Vol. 95:1191
2010] CAN BAD SCIENCE BE GOOD EVIDENCE? 1219
there is "very little basis" for confidence in the results produced so far,
or that claims about fMRI results have been made "prematurely," they
are imposing an evaluative standard on the experimental results. This
is as it should be, for we cannot make sense of these or any results
without having some evaluative standard. But the evaluative standard
to be used by the law, even when it is science that is being evaluated,
must be based on law's goals, law's purposes, and law's structures, and
as is so often the case, what is good outside of law may not be good
enough inside it. Less obvious but often more important is the corol-
lary-that what is not good enough elsewhere may sometimes be good
enough for law.
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